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“DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL:” HAS THE POLICY
MET ITS GOALS?
Chad C. Carter, Captain, USAF1
Antony Barone Kolenc, Major, USAF

I believe the policy I am announcing today represents a real
step forward . . . . The policy . . . is, in my judgment, the
right thing to do and the best way to do it . . . . We now have
a policy that is a substantial advance over the one in place
when I took office . . . . Thus, on the grounds of both
principle and practicality, this is a major step forward.
~ President William J. Clinton, July 19, 1993 2
[I]t is clear that the policy, as implemented, is not working.
~ President William J. Clinton, August 12, 2003 3

In the short run, I got the worst of both worlds — I lost the
fight, and the gay community was highly critical of me for
the compromise . . . .
~ President William J. Clinton, excerpt from My Life, 2004 4
INTRODUCTION
Why is President Clinton’s hopeful new policy regarding
homosexuals in the military essentially deemed a failure today? Has the
policy—hailed at the time as “the right thing to do” and “a major step
forward”5—gone completely wrong? Did it fail to meet its goals? 6 This

1

Chad C. Carter, Captain, USAF (J.D., Southern University Law Center) and Antony Barone Kolenc,
Major, USAF (J.D., University of Florida College of Law) are Assistant Professors in the Department of
Law at the U.S. Air Force Academy. The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and do
not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.
2
William J. Clinton, President’s Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and Lesbians in the
Military, 29 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 1369-72 (July 19, 1993) [hereinafter President’s Remarks].
3
Ltr. from William Jefferson Clinton, former Pres., U.S., to the Servicemembers Leg. Def. Network
(SLDN), Comments on the Military’s Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Policy, (Aug. 12, 2003) (copy on file with
SLDN and published on their website at www.sldn.org).
4
William Jefferson Clinton, My Life 486 (Vintage Books 2004).
5
President’s Remarks, supra n. 2, at 1369-72.
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Article will use the latest data to argue otherwise.
President Clinton and the drafters7 of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”—in
colloquial parlance8—carefully crafted the policy with two express
purposes. First, they envisioned that homosexuals could honorably serve in
the military without fear of discharge because of their homosexual
orientation.9 In essence, the military would only separate members for
homosexual conduct, not orientation. Second, its drafters sought to
discourage harassment of homosexual service members due to their sexual
orientation.10 For instance, the policy placed more stringent limits on when
a commander could investigate alleged homosexual conduct.11
But today, President Clinton and most gay rights advocates co nsider
the policy a dismal failure—in some respects even worse than the one in
place before it.12 Yet the most recent data suggests the policy, as refined, is
largely working as originally envisioned.
Section I of this Article will briefly recount the political
compromise that led to the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, as well as the
6

This Article will not advocate a position on whether gays, lesbians, or bisexuals should be permitted to
serve in the United States Armed Forces. Instead, it will objectively evaluate the “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” policy using the stated goals at the time President Clinton implemented it. This Article will also
not address the financial costs involved in discharging personnel for homosexual conduct, since those
numbers are not accurately known and those concerns were not part of the President’s stated goals for the
policy. See Military Personnel – Financial Costs and Loss of Critical Skills Due to DoD’s Homosexual
Conduct Policy Cannot Be Completely Estimated, GAO-05-299 (U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off. Feb. 23, 2005)
[hereinafter 2005 GAO Report].
7
President Clinton has acknowledged that Sociologist and Professor Charles Moskos is the primary
author of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” The President has referred to Mr. Moskos by name in several of his
remarks regarding the formation of the policy. See Clinton, supra n. 4, at 484; President’s Remarks,
supra n. 2, at 1371; see also Charles Moskos & Michelle M. Benecke, Suffering in Silence, Wash. Post
A23 (July 18, 2000) (identifying Moskos as “the author” of the policy).
8
See Les Aspin & Jamie Gorelick, News Conf., Regarding the Regulations on Homosexual Conduct in
the Military
(Dec. 22, 1993) [hereinafter DoD News Conference] (available at
http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/NewsConf.pdf) (referring to the new policy as “Don’t ask; Don’t tell;
Don’t pursue”).
9
President Clinton proclaimed that the new policy would “provide[] greater protection to those who
happen to be homosexual and want to serve their country honorably in uniform, . . . . [S]ervice men and
women will be judged based on their conduct, not their sexual orientation.” President’s Remarks, supra
n. 2, at 1370, 1372.
10
President Clinton argued, “[T]his is an end to witch hunts that spend millions of taxpayer dollars to
ferret out individuals who have served their country well. Improper conduct, on or off base, should
remain grounds for discharge. But we will proceed with an even hand against everyone, regardless of
sexual orientation.” Id. at 1372. See also White House Background Briefing Concerning the Issue of
Gays in the Military (July 16, 1993) [hereinafter Background Briefing] (available at
http://dont.stanford.edu/regulations/briefing.pdf) (calling the “most significant advance” of the new
policy “no witch hunts, no pursuit policy”).
11
See infra notes 100 to 104 and accompanying text.
12
See Janet E. Halley, Don’t: A Reader’s Guide to the Military’s Anti-Gay Policy 1 (Duke U. Press 1999)
(arguing “The new military policy is much, much worse than its predecessor”); see also Diane H. Mazur,
Word Games, War Games, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1590, 1591 (2000) (agreeing that “the climate for gay
service members has become much, much worse since the 1993 debate,” but blaming this change for the
worse on the notion that the military now has “a greater institutional commitment to enforcing the
exclusionary policy [of gays].”); SLDN, Conduct Unbecoming: The Tenth Annual Report on “Don’t Ask,
Don’t
Tell,
Don’t
Pursue,
Don’t
Harass”
16,
http://www.sldn.org/binarydata/SLDN_ARTICLES/pdf_file/1411.pdf (accessed Sept. 9, 2004) (stating “It quickly became cl ear that
far from a liberalization of the prior regulations, ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ was a ban on gay service of the
most insidious kind”).
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justification behind the exclusion of practicing homosexuals. Section II will
explore how the policy has succeeded in allowing homosexuals to serve
without fear of discharge based on sexual orientation. It will consider the
newest statistics and practices not previously evaluated in the scholarly
literature. Section III will examine how the policy has allowed homosexuals
to serve without pursuit and harassment, and will suggest areas for
improvement. Finally, Section IV will consider the future of the policy in
light of recent judicial pronouncements.
I.

A.

FORMING PRESIDENT CLINTON’S POLICY: FROM NAÏVE IDEALISM
TO STATUTORY LAW
Military Resistance to President Clinton’s Desire to End the Ban

During autumn of 1991, at Harvard University, then-candidate
William Clinton vowed that, as president, he would issue an executive order
to overturn the military’s policy excluding homosexuals, just as President
Truman had done to abolish racial segregation.13 Candidate Clinton
campaigned on this issue throughout 199214 and, following his election,
showed no signs of backing off this campaign promise.15 Following his
inauguration, however, President Clinton met with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff,16 at their behest, to hear concerns about overturning the ban.17 As a
result of this meeting, the President postponed lifting the ban for six months
to allow senior military leadership time to offer their views.18
Resistance to the President’s plan stemmed from a longstanding

13

See Craig A. Rimmerman, Promise Unfulfilled: Clinton’s Failure to Overturn the Military Ban on
Lesbians and Gays, Gay Rights, Military Wrongs 111, 113 (Garland Publishing 1996); see also Tom
Morganthau, Douglas Waller, Daniel Glick, Mark Miller, & John Barry, Gays and the Military: How Far
Will Clinton Go?, Newsweek 52 (Feb. 1, 1993).
14
Where the Candidates Stand on the Issues, Associated Press, Oct. 31, 1992 (quoting Candidate Clinton
as saying, “I support repeal of the ban on gays and lesbians serving in the United States armed forces, in
accord with a Pentagon study which stated that allowing gays and lesbians to serve would have no
detrimental impact on our military strength”).
15
Evans and Novak, (Cable News Network (CNN) television broadcast, Dec. 5, 1992, transcript at 6)
(quoting George Stephanopoulos, President-elect Clinton’s communications director: “Governor Clinton
will fulfill his commitment, the commitment he made in his campaign, to end discrimination against
homosexuals, against gays, in the military . . . .”). See also Cragg Hines, Clinton Renews Promise to
Allow Gays in Military, Houston Chron. A1 (Nov. 12, 1992) (quoting Clinton as promising to fulfill his
campaign promise to allow homosexuals to serve in the military).
16
“The Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] consist of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the
Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps . . . . The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military advis[o]r to the
President, Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council (NSC) . . . .” See Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/ (accessed Sept. 9, 2005). The Joint Chiefs
of Staff at the time of this meeting with the President consisted of Army General Colin Powell, Chairman
of t he Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Gordon Sullivan, Chief of Staff of the Army, Admiral Frank Kelso, Chief of Naval Operations, General
Merrill A. McPeak, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the
Marine Corps. See id. (listing prior JCS members).
17
See Clinton, supra n. 4, at 485.
18
See id.
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military belief that openly gay members should be excluded from its ranks.19
Military leaders have articulated three reasons to exclude homosexuals.20
The first argument—mental illness—fell by the wayside in the 1970s when
the American Psychological Association began to modify its
characterization of homosexuality as a mental disorder.21 The second
rationale—national security—depreciated in the 1980s after reports found
little basis for this security concern.22 The third justification, however,
remained: the impact on morale, good order, and discipline.23 The most
compelling facet of this argument maintains that allowing openly gay
members to serve will harm the armed forces in light of the forced intimacy
and lack of privacy that permeate military life.24
A fourth rationale—not often articulated by military leaders—

19

See Daniel R. Plane, Comments: Don’t Mess with “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 79 Marq. L. Rev. 377, 38184 (1995) (documenting the history of the ban from the Continental Army through 1993).
20
Robin Ingli, Gays in the Military: A Policy Analysis of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the Solomon
Amendment, 20 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Policy 89, 89-93 (1998) (analyzing various reasons given by
military leaders to exclude gays).
21
See id. at 91. The APA first backed away from classifying homosexuality as a mental disorder in its
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) II in 1973, eventually dropping any classification altogether in
1987 upon release of the DSM IV. See id. at 91.
22
See SLDN, supra n. 12, at 6. Critics of the policy cite four key reports to demonstrate the lack of
evidence, es pecially regarding the idea that homosexuals are greater security risks: 1) the Report of the
Board of Appointed to Prepare and Submit recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy for the
Revision of Policies, Procedures and Directives Dealing with Homosexuality [“the Crittenden Report”]
(Mar. 15, 1957); 2) Theodore R. Sarbin, Ph.D & Kenneth E. Karols, M.D., Ph.D, Defense Personnel
Security Research and Education Center, Nonconforming Sexual Orientation and Military Suitability
[“the PERSEREC Report”] (1988); 3) M. McDaniel, Defense Personnel Security Research and
Education Center, Preservice Adjustment of Homosexual and Heterosexual Military Accessions:
Implications for Security Clearance Suitability (1999); 4) RAND Corp., Sexual Orientation and U.S.
Military Personnel Policy, Options and Assessment (1993). It is notable that the Crittenden Report never
questioned the underlying premise of the DoD policy.
See DoD’s Policy on Homosexuality,
GAO/NS IAD-92-98 30-31 (U.S. Gen. Acctg. Off. June 12, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 GAO Report]
(discussing the report). In fact, the Crittenden Report found no data to prove homosexuals were more of
a security risk “than those engaged in other unsocial or immoral activity.” Id. The report still found,
however, that “the propensities and vulnerabilities associated with homosexual activity, . . . do provide
serious security implications.” Id. Similarly, the PERSEREC Report, finalized in 1991, found no
evidence that would support the notion that homosexuals are a greater security risk. See id. at 3 3-34.
PERSEREC went beyond its mandate and also commented on the compatibility of homosexuals in the
military service, criticizing the premise of incompatibility. See id. In the wake of this report, DoD
officials backed away from the notion that security risk is a major factor in the exclusion of homosexuals
from military service. See id. at 35 (quoting 1991 statements of the Secretary of Defense and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
23
Robin Ingli notes two justifications for this argument: 1) concerns with reaction to o penly gay service
members from those who believe such a lifestyle is immoral; and, 2) the possibility of cliques forming in
military units based on one’s sexual orientation, resulting in “subcultures that could lead to disruption of
unit functioning due to favoritism . . . .” Ingli, supra n. 20, at 92.
24
See Plane, supra n. 19, at 379. The reality of military life is that “vast numbers of service members
reside in open-bay barracks or in cramped living areas on board ships or submarines. Privacy, . . . is
simply inconsistent with the exigencies of military duty, . . . [S]ervice members have little or no choice
in their duty station . . . .” Id. There are also real issues such as gender segregation and same-sex
couples occupying the same barrack room, in violation of the policy forbidding heterosexual couples
from this rooming situation. Id. at 386-87. Moreover, some high-risk homosexual activities could
compromise the required “extremely high state of physical readiness” in the military. Id. at 388-89. See
also Charles Moskos, Editorial, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell:” 10 years, 2 views; The Law Works Fine – and
Here’s Why, A.F. Times 62 (Oct. 27, 2003) (stating “Nowhere in our society are the sexes forced to
undress in front of each other. Most women dislike being stripped of privacy before the opposite sex.
Similarly, most heterosexual men dislike being exposed to male homosexuals.”).
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emphasizes the “general societal commitment that homosexuality is a
morally objectionable lifestyle” that should not be “encouraged” by the
military.25 In 1993, Americans supported that societal commitment; but
public opinion is shifting. 26 Still, despite Department of Defense (DoD)
acknowledgments that many discharged homosexuals “have exemplary
records and have held important positions within their un its,”27 the policy of
excluding openly gay members continues to find strong support within the
armed forces. In a 2005 poll only 25 percent of surveyed service members
favored allowing openly gay service members in their ranks—65 percent
opposed such a change.28
B.

Congressional Resistance Leads to the Codification of “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell”

Many Democrats and Republicans in Congress reacted to President
Clinton’s plan by threatening to codify the ban as law—an action which
would have destroyed any hope of modifying the ban.29 So the President
compromised. He ordered Secretary of Defense Les Aspin to wo rk with the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on an arrangement that could please the military,
Congress, and the President’s constituents who wanted the ban lifted.30 This
compromise became “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” 31 Whereas candidate Clinton
had hoped to permit gays to serve openly, President Clinton settled for
simply preventing gays from being excluded from the armed forces because
of status alone.32 The President’s modified stance sought to allow
homosexuals to serve in the military “unless their conduct disqualifies them
from doing so.”33 The DoD implemented the new policy on July 19, 1993. 34

25

Gary L. Young, Jr., Symposium: “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell: Gays in the Military the Price of Public
Endorsement:” A Reply to Mr. Marcosson, 64 Marq. L. Rev. 99, 107 (1995) (reframing the debate to
focus on this societal interest but, noting that practical difficulties of incorporating homosexuals into
military life can be worked out).
26
David F. Burrelli & Charles Dale, Homosexuals and U.S. Military Policy: Current Issues, 6 -7 (Cong.
Research Serv. Rpt. for Cong. 2005) (citing a July 1993 poll that showed 40% of those surveyed in favor
of and 52% opposed to allowing openly gay people to serve in the military, compared with a November
2004 poll that showed 62% in favor and 32% opposed).
27
1992 GAO Report, supra n. 22, at 38. But see Moskos, supra n. 24, at 62 (acknowledging that gays
serving discreetly in the military have proven to be successful, which is “the point—they cause no ill
feelings precisely because they’re discreet.”).
28
Burrelli & Dale, supra n. 26, at 6-7.
29
See Clinton, supra n. 4, at 484; See also Kenneth T. Walsh, Matthew Cooper, Steven V. Roberts, &
Bruce B. Auster, Why Clinton Fights for Gays, U.S. News & World Rpt. 36 (Feb. 8, 1993) (discussing
the political resistance to President Clinton’s hope to change the military’s policy).
30
See Clinton, supra n. 4, at 485; see also Background Briefing, supra n. 10, at 16.
31
See DoD News Conference, supra n. 8, at 4 (explaining the development of the new policy). There is
no doubt that the new policy was a compromise that did not entirely please the President. When
presenting his new policy, President Clinton acknowledged, “[This policy] is not a perfect solution. It is
not identical with some of my own goals. And it certainly will not please everyone, perhaps not anyone,
and clearly not those who hold the most adamant opinions on either side of the issue.” President’s
Remarks, supra n. 2, at 1372.
32
See President’s News Conference, 29 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 108, 109 (Jan. 29, 1993).
33
Id. at 109. The Clinton Administration referred to this as a very conduct-based policy. DoD News
Conference, supra n. 8, at 4.
34
See Memo. from Les Aspin, Sec. of Def., to the Sec. of the Army, Sec. of the Navy, Sec. of the A.F.
and Chairman, Jt. Chiefs of Staff, Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces (July 19, 1993)
[hereinafter DoD Me mo]. DoD-wide instructions and directives later set out specific guidance on the
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The policy stated, “A person’s sexual orientation is considered a personal
and private matter, and is not a bar to service entry or continued service
unless manifested by homosexual conduct . . . .”35
On November 30, 1993, Congress codified the “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” policy as law, making fifteen key findings.36
Invoking its
37
constitutional authority to regulate the military, Congress emphasized the
military’s purpose to “prepare for and to prevail in combat” and the
requirement for “high morale, good order and discipline, and unit
cohesion.”38 Acknowledging the fundamental difference between civilian
and military life, Congress found that service members must “involuntarily”
live and work in “forced intimacy with little or no privacy.”39 Congress then
noted the “longstanding” prohibition against homosexual conduct in military
law. 40 Finally, it found that those who engage in such conduct—or
“demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in” it—“create an
unacceptable risk” to the standards that are “the essence of military
policy, investigations into homosexual conduct, and what conduct or statements constituted a violation of
the policy. See Investigations of Sexual Misconduct by the Defense Criminal Investigative Organizations
and Other DoD Law Enforcement Organizations, Dept. of Def. Instr. (DoDI) 5505.8, para. 4 (June 6,
2000) (setting out the policy that criminal investigative services “shall not conduct an investigation solely
to determine whether a Servicemember is a heterosexual, a homosexual, or a bisexual.”); Enlisted
Administrative Separations, Dept. of Def. Directive (DoDD) 1332.14, para. E3.A4 (Dec. 21, 1993) and
Separation Procedures for Regular and Reserve Commissioned Officers, DoDI 1332.40, para. E8 (Sep.
16, 1997) (outlining guidelines for fact-finding inquiries into homosexual conduct and limiting the
initiation of such investigations to the member’s commander). Each service passed their own regulations
to uniquely implement the DoD guidance. See Army Command Policy, Army Regulation (AR) 60 0-20,
para. 4-19 (May 13, 2002) (covering general Army policies on homosexual conduct); Active Duty
Enlisted Administrative Separations, AR 635-200, ch. 15 (July 15, 2004) (covering Army enlisted
separations); Officer Transfers and Discharges, AR 600-8-24, para. 4-22 (Feb. 2 4, 2005) (covering Army
officer discharges); Administrative Discharge Procedures for Commissioned Officers, Air Force
Instruction (AFI) 36-3206, attch. 2 (June 9, 2004) (covering investigation and discharge of officer
homosexual conduct cases); Separating Commissioned Officers, AFI 36-3207, para. 3.16.1.4 (June 9,
2004) (covering officer separations); Administrative Separation of Airmen, AFI 3 6-3208, attch. 4 (July
9, 2004) (covering enlisted homosexual investigations and discharges); Administrative Separation of
Officers, Sec. of the Navy Instr. (SECNAVINST) 1920.6B, encl. 3(c) (Dec. 13, 1999) (covering officer
discharges); Enlisted Administrative Separations, SECNAVINST 1910.4B, encl. 1H (May 29, 1996)
(covering enlisted discharges); Marine Corps Separation Manual (MARCORSEPMAN) MCO
P1900.16.E, para. 4103(3) (covering officer discharges) and para. 6207 (covering enlisted discharges)
(Apr. 10, 2000) (covering homosexual conduct separations); Coast Guard Personnel Manual,
COMDTINST M1000.6, Ch. 12-E (Mar. 8, 2005) (covering discharges of enlisted or officers).
35
Qualification Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction, DoDD 1304.26, para. E1.2.8.1
(Dec. 21, 1993).
36
See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)–(15) (2000). Congress investigated the issue fully before making these
findings. For instance, the Senate Armed Services Committee staff “interviewed thousands of military
personnel on 21 bases. In six hearings, including field hearings, talking with soldiers, sailors, airmen
where they live and work, thousands of pages of testimony were collected.” 139 Cong. Rec . S7603
(daily ed. June 22, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dan Coats (R-IN)).
37
See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)-(3) (2000) (invoking Article I, Sec tion 8’s delegation to “raise and support
armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules for the government and regulation of the land and
naval forces.”).
38
Id. at § 654 (a)(4)-(7).
39
Id. at § 654(a)(8)-(12). During Congress’s investigation, one sailor clearly explained the forced
intimacy inherent in military life. “On one submarine we were on, some of the torpedoes were removed,
thanks to the demise of the cold war, and some of that space was used for sleeping area . . . . Sailors had
to crawl over each other to enter their bunk and to leave their bunk. They were then required to share a
shower, 63 to share 2 showers. Sexual privacy is virtually nonexistent.” 139 Cong. Rec. S7605 (daily
ed. June 22, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dan Coats (R-IN)).
40
10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(13) (2000).
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capability.”41
Based on its findings, Congress mandated three grounds for the
separation of homosexuals. First, a service member “shall” be discharged if
he or she engages in, attempts to engage in, or solicits “a homosexual act.”42
This discharge can be avoided only if the member demonstrates that these
actions 1) were not his or her “usual and customary behavior;” 2) are
“unlikely to recur;” and 3) were not accomplished through “force, coercion,
or intimidation.”43 The member must also show that his or her “continued
presence” is consistent with the military’s interests and that he or she “does
not have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts.”44 Second,
Congress required that a member be discharged for stating “that he or she is
a homosexual or bisexual,” unless he or she can also demonstrate “that he or
she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity
to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.”45 Third, a member
must be discharged for marrying or attempting to marry someone of the
same sex.46
Congress provided flexibility, however, by allowing retention of
members who violated the policy simply to escape military service or whose
separation “would not be in the best interest of the armed forces.”47 To
ensure dissemination of the policy, Congress required that it be included on
enlistment and appointment documents and briefed to all service members
upon entry into the service and “periodically thereafter.”48
II.
A.

“D ON’T ASK, DON’T TELL ” HAS ALLOWED HOMOSEXUALS TO SERVE
WITHOUT FEAR OF DISCHARGE DUE TO THEIR SEXUAL ORIENTATION
“Don’t Ask” and “Don’t Tell”

The most striking difference between President Clinton’s “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and previous DoD policies is the elimination of any
questions related to the sexual orientation of those applying for or entering
the armed forces—“Don’t Ask.” 49 The DoD codified “Don’t Ask” in a

41

Id. at § 65 4(a)(14)-(15).
Id. at § 654(b)(1). Congress defined a “homosexual act” to include “any bodily contact . . . for the
purpose of satisfying sexual desires; and any bodily contact which a reasonable person would understand
to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act . . . .” Id. at § 6 54(f)(3).
43
Id. at § 654 (b)(1)(A)-(C).
44
Id. at § 65 4(b)(1)(D)-(E).
45
Id. at § 654(b)(2). The DoD clarified what it meant by the term propensity: “Propensity to engage in
homosexual acts means more than an abstract preference or desire to engage in homosexual acts; it
indicates a likelihood that a person engages in or will engage in homosexual acts.” Separation of
Regular and Reserve Commissioned Officers, Dept. of Def. Dir. (DoDD) 1332.30, para. 2-2(C)(1)(b)
(Mar. 14, 1997).
46
See id. at § 654(b)(3).
47
Id. at § 654(e)(2).
48
Id. at § 654(c)-(d).
49
See 1992 GAO Report, supra n. 22, at 38 (providing a concise summary of the Department of
Defense’s previous policy on homosexual conduct). In brief, the previous policy—formed in 1982—
partly stated, “Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the military
environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by their statements, demonstrate a
42
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directive, prohibiting the armed forces from asking applicants “whether they
are heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual” and whether “they have engaged
in homosexual conduct . . . .”50 Congress warily supported “Don’t Ask”
when it codified the policy as law.51
The “Don’t Tell” aspect of the policy requires service members to
refrain from revealing their homosexual or bisexual orientations,52 including
statements as simple as: I am gay. 53 The old DoD policy contained a similar
prohibition.54 President Clinton believed his new policy placed the burden
squarely on the individual to keep such personal matters purely private or
risk discharge.55 His administration expected homosexual service members
to comply with military regulations—including those prohibiting
homosexual conduct—“at all times and in all places.”56
B.

“Don’t Tell” is Truly Conduct-Based

Some of the staunchest critics of the policy concede that “Don’t
Ask” is a success. 57 Since applicants are no longer questioned about their
sexual orientation, homosexuals have joined the military “without any entry
barriers.”58 “Don’t Tell,” however, has been greatly maligned.
“Statement” cases under “Don’t Tell” comprise 83 percent of all
homosexual conduct separations in the armed forces.59 It is no wonder then
that it has become the target of intense criticism. Gay advocacy groups
argue that “Don’t Tell” is a status-based policy masquerading as a conductpropensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military
mission.” Id. at 2.
50
DoDD 1304.26, supra n. 35, at 9, para. E1.2.8.1. Although applicants are not asked these questions,
the DoD Directive allows the rejection of applicants based on homosexual conduct when such evidence
is “received” “in the course of the accession process.” Id. at E1.2.8.2.1.
51
See National Defense Authorizations Act For FY94, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571(d), 107 Stat. 1547,
1673 (1993) (“It is the sense of Congress that- - (1) the suspension of questioning concerning
homosexuality as part of the processing of individuals for accession into the Armed Forces under the
interim policy of January 29, 1993, should be continued, but the Secretary of Defense may reinstate that
questioning . . . as he considers appropriate . . . .”).
52
See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b).
53
See id.; DoDD 1332.14, supra n. 34, at E3.A4.1.4.3; DoDI 1332.40, supra n. 34, at E8.4.3.
54
See 1992 GAO Report, supra n. 22, at 11-12. See also Mazur, supra n. 12, at 1595 (arguing that the
revisions to the military policy in 1993-94 were “distinction[s] without a difference”).
55
See President’s Remarks, supra n. 2, at 1372 (“Just as is the case under current policy, unacceptable
conduct, either heterosexual or homosexual, will be unacceptable 24 hours a day, 7 days a week from the
time a recruit joins the service until the day he or she is discharged.”).
56
President’s Remarks, supra n. 2, at 1372. See also DoD Memo, supra n. 34.
57
See Halley, supra n. 12, at 49. See also SLDN, supra n. 12, at 19 (“Over time, command-directed
asking and pursuing decreased.”).
58
Young, supra n. 25, at 113 (referencing Preliminary DoD Policy Guidelines on Homosexuals in the
Military (July 19, 1993); 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994); and Secretary of Defense Directives Implementing the
New DoD Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces (Feb. 5, 1994)).
59
See 2005 GAO Report, supra n. 6, at 1 1. This GAO Report indicates that from fiscal years 1994
through 2003, 83% of military separations under the DoD’s homosexual conduct policy were because the
member “stated he or she is a homosexual, bisexual, or words to that effect.” Further, Charles Moskos
argues that “more than 80 percent” of homosexual conduct discharge cases in the military “are the result
of voluntary ‘statements’ by service members.” Moskos, supra n. 24, at 62. He adds, “the number of
discharges for homosexual ‘acts’ has declined over the past decade.” Id. As to the motive behind the
making of such statements, Mr. Moskos claims, “Whether you’re gay or not, saying you are is now the
quickest way out of the military with an honorable discharge. And identifying oneself as gay carries less
stigma in society than it once did.” Id.
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based prohibition. They believe it inhibits free speech and forces members
to hide their gay identities even where they follow the DoD’s policy on
conduct.60 “[N]othing short of celibacy and complete secrecy would be
necessary for gay service members to avoid discharge under [‘Don’t Tell’],”
they conclude.61 They also argue that forcing homosexuals to prove their
“celibacy” devalues human dignity and sexual expression. 62 But these
criticisms miss the mark.
Concededly, “Don’t Tell” states that the outward acknowledgment
of one’s homosexual or bisexual orientation creates a rebuttable
presumption that one intends to engage in homosexual conduct.63 But this
issue has been litigated under both the old and the new DoD policies, with
courts recognizing that this type of rebuttable presumption is in fact
conduct-based.64 Open statements of one’s homosexual orientation are
closely associated with engaging in the homosexual acts that can serve as
the basis for discharge—the military may rely on such presumptions “that
avoid the administratively costly need to adduce proof of conduct or
intent….”65 And for those who do not intend to engage in the prohibited
conduct, due process affords them a full administrative hearing.66 The
criticisms about free speech and human dignity are actually attacks on the
more general policy determination to exclude service members who engage
in homosexual conduct. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” merely seeks to
implement that broader policy in the fairest way.
The Servicemembers Legal Defense Network (SLDN)—a military
gay-rights group—has recently documented numerous examples of
individuals who “came out” openly but successfully used discharge hearings

60
Halley, supra n. 12, at 27-56 (arguing that the new policy is status-based). See also Mazur, supra n.
12, at 1591 (arguing it is a mistake to distinguish “status” from “conduct” because it is a faulty
“assumption that it is possible to be just metaphysically gay – a sterile, stark orientation or status – and
not engage in conduct, or have any propensity to engage in conduct, that is inextricably associated with
that status.”).
61
SLDN, supra n. 12, at 16. “An honest statement by a gay service member of his or her sexual
orientation to anyone, at anytime, anywhere may lead to discharge,” the SLDN organization charges. Id.
at 13. But see Plane, supra n. 19, at 379, 398-99 (arguing that the policy gives homosexuals the ability to
serve “without the stigma of having to lie about their sexuality during their military career” and that with
“a modicum of self-restraint and discretion, homosexual service members will now be able to serve
proudly in all branches of the Armed Forces.”).
62
See Halley, supra n. 12, at 3-5 (criticizing the policy for forcing members to prove they are not
homosexual).
63
See DODD 1332.14, supra n. 34, at 70, para. E3.A4.4.5 (discussing the rebuttable presumption in
enlisted separations).
64
See Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that s peech declaring homosexuality is
the equivalent of a homosexual act or the propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts); Steffan v.
Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that homosexual statements put a member in a sufficiently
close class to those who engage in or intend to engage in homosexual conduct).
65
See Steffan, 41 F.3d at 686 (noting that “the military certainly furthers its policy of discharging those
members who either engage in, or are likely to engage in, homosexual conduct when it discharges those
who state that they are homosexual.”).
66
See DODD 1332.14, supra n. 34, at para. E3.A4.4.5 (providing service members the opportunity to
present evidence in order to rebut the presumption).
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to convince the board to retain them.67 While most gay service members do
not demand a hearing,68 the noted successes illustrate “Don’t Tell’s”
workability. If a homosexual can demonstrate the capability to follow
conduct-based rules, he or she may be retained. In the end, conduct—not
orientation—expels the member from military service.
C.

Increases in Homosexual Conduct Separations Do Not Indicate a
Policy Failure

The number of homosexual conduct separations under “Don’t Ask,
Don’t’ Tell” pales in comparison to other reasons for separation from the
armed forces.69 Yet gay rights advocates have repeatedly called for a repeal
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” arguing that the policy hurts the military by
wasting talented personnel.70 The most recent backlash against the policy
came in 2003 when the military discharged 37 gay linguist students—some
studying Arabic—from the Defense Language Institute in Monterey,
California. 71 Condemnation of these discharges was rampant, with major
newspapers citing the incident as yet another reason to overturn the ban.72
1.

Do the Statistics Add Up?

It is understandable why many believed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
would lessen the number of homosexual conduct separations. Common
sense suggests that the loosening of restrictions should result in fewer
violations. But it is also reasonable to believe the number of separations
after 1993 should have increased because “applicants [would] no longer [be]
asked about their sexual orientation when enlisting in the Armed Forces,”
leading more of them to make statements of homosexuality once they are in
the military. 73 In any event, critics view statistics of “increased”

67

See SLDN, supra n. 12, at 17, 22-23 (citing various cases where openly gay members were allowed to
continue to serve); see also Mazur, supra n. 12, at 1591 (criticizing the hyperbole of some gay advocates
that unreasonably allege that the military discharges people for behavior that merely “looks gay,” noting
that discharge boards have never forced a member to disprove propensity on any other basis than a
statement of homosexuality).
68
See Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), Report to the Secretary of
Defense, Review of the Effectiveness of the Application and Enforcement of the Department’s Policy on
Homosexual Conduct in the Military, Summary of Findings I (1998) [hereinafter OSD Report] (noting
that the “great majority of discharges for homosexual conduct are uncontested and are processed
administratively.”).
69
For instance, while discharges under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” have comprised just over one third of
1% of all military discharges, almost four times as many members were discharged for not complying
with weight standards and almost three times as many were discharged due to pregnancy. See 2005
GAO Report, supra n. 6, at 42.
70
In its Tenth Annual Report after “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the SLDN noted, “This irrational policy of
exclusion has cost our nation, and our security, almost 10,000 dedicated and trained Americans over the
past ten years.” SLDN, supra n. 12, at 2; see also Mazur, supra n. 12, at 1591 (noting that gay advocacy
has tended to “exaggerate the irrationality of the policy” and that “the policy is quite irrational on its
own.”).
71
See Vincent J. Schodolski, Military Loses Able Recruits with Gay Rule; Ousted Linguists’ Skills Badly
Needed, Chi. Trib. N8 (Jan. 23, 2003).
72
See id.
73
See OSD Report, supra n. 68, at § Discussion (I)(A).
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homosexual conduct separations as proof that the policy has failed.74
Under the prior policy, the DoD annually discharged almost 1,500
homosexuals between 1980 and 1990, a total of about 17,000 discharges. 75
But in the decade since “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the DoD discharged
approximately 9,500 homosexuals76—an apparent decrease. Yet although
the total number of discharges has decreased under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”
the relative number of discharges has remained statistically the same on
average because the DoD significantly reduced the number of military
personnel after the Cold War.77 Moreover, from 1994 through 2001 the
yearly number of homosexual conduct separations rose each year (with the
exception of 1999), reaching a high of 1,217 discharges in 2001. 78 The
discharge numbers sharply dropped off, however, in 2002 and 2003.79
But a closer study of the numbers indicates there is more to the issue
than first meets the eye. A full 83 percent (7,900) of the discharges under
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” through 2003 were “statement” cases of individuals
who voluntarily admitted they were homosexual or bisexual.80 Moreover,
almost 75 percent of the separations came within the first few months or
years of service.81 Some who study these statistics, such as Charles
Moskos—a sociologist and key drafter of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”—suggest
that most “statement” cases are initiated by those who find military life

74

See Eric Schmitt, The Nation: Close Quarters; How is this Strategy Working? Don’t Ask, N.Y. Times
4, 1 (Dec. 19, 1999) (noting that the “soaring” number of homosexual conduct discharges in 1998 was
almost double the 1993 number, and that critics “say the policy has failed”); SLDN, supra n. 12, at 19,
22 (noting the “increased” discharges as examples of the policy’s failure).
75
See 1992 GAO Report, supra n. 22, at 3 ; see also SLDN, supra n. 12 at 23 (noting that these numbers
hit a peak of 2000 discharges in 1982).
76
2005 GAO Report, supra n. 6, at 6 . According to the report, the numbers of discharges for each year
were as follows: 1994–615; 1995–757; 1996–858; 1997–997; 1998–1,145; 1999–1,033; 2000–1,213;
2001–1,217; 2002–884; 2003–769. See id. at 8.
77
From 1980-84, the percentage of homosexual discharges was .086 to .095 of the active duty end
strength. See OSD Report, supra n. 68, at Table I. In 1985-86, that number dropped to .78 and .76 of the
end strength. Id. It continued to drop in the late 1980s: 1987-.064%; 1988-.052%; 1989-.047%; 1990.046%; 1991-.047%; and 1992– .039%. Id. In the first few years of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the
number stayed low before beginning to rise again: 1993-.040%; 1994-.038%; 1995-.050%; 1996-.058%;
and 1997-.069%. Id. Then in 1998, the numbers jumped significantly before dropping off again in 2002:
1998-.081%; 1999-.075%; 2000-.088%, 2001-.089%, 2002-.063%; and 2003-.054%; see Burrelli &
Dale, supra n. 26, at 11 and 12 (citing data obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center and
concluding that “the difference in the percentage discharged before and following the implementation of
the new policy was statistically insignificant.”).
78
See 2005 GAO Report, supra n. 6, at 8.
79
See id. Critics cite this drop-off in discharges during the War on Terror as yet another historical
example of the military ignoring the policy during times of war when more members are needed to put
their lives on the line for their country. See SLDN, supra n. 12, at 22.
80
See 2005 GAO Report, supra n. 6, at 11. In comparison, only 16% (1,520) of the discharged actually
committed, attempted, or solicited homosexual acts, and only 1% (57) married or attempted to marry
another homosexual. See id. This is a significant decrease in the number of “acts” cases from the older
policy. See Moskos, supra n. 24, at 62.
81
Almost 20% of the separations (1,747) occurred during recruit training, with an additional 11% (1,037)
occurring in follow-on training—all within the first six months of military service. See 2005 GAO
Report, supra n. 6, at 17, 31. All told, almost 60% of the discharges (5,446) occurred within one and a
half years of initial service. See id. Another 16% (1,458) were separated within the next year, leaving
only 25% (2,335) to be separated after the two and one half year mark. See id.
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unpleasant and wish to terminate their obligations early. 82 Moskos puts it
simply: “Whether you’re gay or not, saying you are is now the quickest way
out of the military with an honorable discharge.”83 And in 1998, the Clinton
Administration itself defended the high number of “statement” cases under
the policy by arguing that most of those discharged had “voluntarily opted
out” of the military.84
2.

Testing Moskos’s Hypothesis: Changes at Lackland Air Force Base
(AFB).

If Moskos is correct, ”Don’t Tell” may be allowing some military
members—heterosexuals and homosexuals alike—to improperly use the
policy to avoid military service and obtain an honorable discharge.
Moskos’s hypothesis has found empirical support at Lackland AFB, Texas,
where—since 1999—the Air Force has significantly ch anged its han dling of
homosexual “statement” cases during basic military training (BMT). The
results are striking.
All enlisted Air Force recruits receive six weeks of BMT at
Lackland AFB. Under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” Air Force homosexual
conduct separations during BMT skyrocketed, comprising 65 percent of the
total Air Force discharges by 1998.85 But discharge numbers beginning in
1999 decreased dramatically at BMT86 because of a bold new policy for
handling homosexual “statement” cases. Lackland wanted to deny recruits
an “easy out” of rigorous military training by claiming to be homosexual.
“[B]ecause of the stress of Basic Military Training, they want to leave and
they want to leave right now,” explained Colonel Sharon Dunbar, the
commander of the 737th Training Group at Lackland AFB.87
The Lackland regulation governing homosexual conduct separations
now states, “Trainees who make a homosexual admission will remain in
training, in their original flight, until separation action is approved by the
[Wing Commander] or a credible recant statement is made to an officer

82

See Burrelli & Dale, supra n. 26, at 8 (citing various authorities who have proposed this theory).
Moskos, supra n. 24, at 62. See also 2005 GAO Report, supra n. 6, at 7 (indicating that of 5,763
“characterized” discharges, 82% received Honorable discharges, 13% received General, Under
Honorable Conditions discharges, and 5% received Under Other Than Honorable Conditions discharges;
another 3,304 discharges were “uncharacterized” and occurred during the initial six months of training as
“entry level” separations).
84
Gregory L. Vistica & Evan Thomas, Backlash in the Ranks, Newsweek 27 (Apr. 20, 1998) (quoting
William Cohen, President Clinton’s second Secretary of Defense).
85
See Brent Staples, Tinkering at the Margins of Anti-Gay Bigotry, N.Y. Times A24 (Nov. 8, 1999).
86
See Rod Hafemeister, Claiming Homosexuality not an Easy Out in Basic Training, A.F. Times 16
(Sep. 22, 2003). In 1999, the Air Force “invited SLDN to visit the base and assist in a review of the
implementation” of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. SLDN, supra n. 12, at 32. Although SLDN was
generally pleased with the decrease in Lackland discharges since 1999, the organization has not taken
credit for the change. See id. Indeed, the SLDN has criticized the use of Lackland’s new “troubling”
policy because it “require[s]” airmen to “convince officials of their sexual orientation” and officials are
selectively applying the policy by “ignoring statements of sexual orientation made by airmen while in
training.” Id. (citing Hafemeister).
87
See Hafemeister, supra n. 86, at 16 (quoting Colonel Dunbar).
83
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within the chain of command.”88 The regulation requires officials to review
the trainee’s records, speak with instructors, and interview the trainee
personally.89 The interviewing officer confirms that the trainee understands
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the role of each official in the process.90 Most
important, the officer tells the trainee that he or she may “recant” the
statement until the commander “signs the discharge paperwork,” which
could take some time.91 Thus, the trainee continues normal training for the
foreseeable future. If the trainee recants, the commander judges the
“credibility” of the recant statement—if it is deemed credible, the trainee
returns to training as though the trainee “never made [the statement].”92 If
the recantation is not credible, the commander finalizes the trainee’s
discharge. 93 This new practice is consistent with the broader “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” policy because Congress has never required the separation of
persons who make statements about their sexual orientation for the purpose
of avoiding military service.94
The Lackland policy is working. Since its initiation, the number of
homosexual conduct discharges during BMT has dropped from its high of
326 in 1998 to 19 in 2002 and only five in 2003.95 “A majority of them
recant their statement,” explained Lieutenant Colonel Matt Crabbe,
commander of the 319th Training Squadron at Lackland AFB.96 Since the
recruits continue training—which is both difficult and confidencebuilding—while awaiting discharge, many of them realize that there is no
“easy out.” Thus, the theory goes, trainees maintain only the truest
statements of homosexual identity, recanting most improperly motivated
statements.
The Lackland data supports Moskos’s hypothesis that most
“statement” cases are initiated by those who find military life unpleasant and
wish to terminate their obligations early. Homosexual recruits may serve in
the Air Force despite an ill-judged statement made under great stress—as
long as they can follow the conduct-based prohibitions on homosexual acts.

88

737 Training Group Instruction (TRGI) 36-3, Vol I, Basic Military Training, para. 10.3 (Nov. 1, 2004).
Within three days of making the statement of homosexuality or bisexuality, a discharge package is
initiated. See id. at para. 10.3.1. Prior to meeting with the trainee who made the statement, an operations
officer will review the trainee’s records and speak with the trainees military training instructors (MTIs) to
“determine the circumstances and nature of the disclosure/statement and the trainee’s progress in
training.” Id. at para. 10.3.4.1.
Then, the officer will brief the trainee in a “non-intimidating
environment” about the homosexual conduct discharge process, inquire about any problems in training or
at home, and allow the trainee to make a phone call home. Id. at para. 10.3.5.3.
90
Id. at para. 10.3.6-7. The officer also ensures that nobody coerced the trainee into making the
statement. See id.
91
Id. at para. 10.3.7.1-2.
92
Id. at para. 10.3.10, 13; see also Hafemeister, supra n. 86, at 16 (quoting Colonel Dunbar regarding the
effect after a recanted statement).
93
See 737 TRGI 36-3, supra n. 88, at para. 10.3.15.
94
See 10 U.S.C. § 654(e)(1) (2000) (noting as a rule of construction that the policy does not require
separation of those who “engaged in conduct or made statements for the purpose of avoiding or
terminating military service”)..
95
See Hafemeister, supra n. 86, at 16.
96
See id. (quoting Lieutenant Colonel Crabbe).
89
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Moreover, heterosexual recruits no longer have an incentive to fabricate
homosexual statements to find an “easy out.” Since the overwhelming
number of homosexual conduct separations are “statement” cases made
during training or early in a member’s career, Moskos is surely correct—the
“increased” discharge numbers are not proof the policy has failed. Given
the small number of “acts” cases, it appears that homosexual members who
wish to serve in the military can do so if they avoid open statements about
their homosexuality. To avoid continued misuses of the policy, therefore,
the armed services should more cautiously enforce “Don’t Tell” using a
model similar to that at Lackland AFB.97
III.

A.

HAS “D ON’T PURSUE, DON’T HARASS ” ALLOWED HOMOSEXUALS TO
SERVE WITHOUT FEAR OF HARASSMENT DUE TO THEIR SEXUAL
ORIENTATION?
“Don’t Pursue” and “Don’t Harass”

The Clinton Administration hoped its new policy would end
harassment and witch hunts against homosexuals in the military. The
President sought an end to “witch hunts . . . to ferret out individuals who
have served their country well.”98 He wanted to create a “ zone of privacy in
the military for individuals.”99 These desires led to the creation of the
“Don’t Pursue” and “Don’t Harass” prongs of the policy. While “Don’t
Pursue” has achieved a large measure of success, “Don’t Harass” persists as
the area most in need of improvement.
The “Don’t Pursue” prong of the policy focuses primarily on the
conduct of military commanders, with emphasis on deterring investigations
into homosexuality.100 Military law enforcement can neither investigate a
member’s sexual orientation nor consensual sexual conduct—that discretion
is left to a member’s commander.101 To investigate, a commander must

97

The Army has been using a similar policy to deal with Reservists or National Guard members who first
make statements about their sexual orientation when they are called onto active duty in order to deploy in
support of Army operations. See Lou Chibbaro Jr., Out Gay Soldiers Sent to Iraq, WASHINGTON BLADE
ONLINE Sep. 23, 2005. According to FORSCOM Reg 500-3-3, FORMDEPS, Volume III, Reserve
Component Unit Commander's Handbook (RCUCH) (1999), if a separation based on a homosexual
statement “is not requested prior to the unit’s receipt of alert notification, the discharge is not authorized.
Member will enter AD [active duty] with the unit.” Id.
98
President’s Remarks, supra n. 2, at 1372.
99
Background Briefing, supra n. 10, at 1.
100
See id. at 13 (“You will not as easily have investigations as you do today . . . . [B]efore an
investigation into homosexual conduct . . . is triggered, make sure the people . . . have credible
information.”).
101
See DoDI 5505.8, supra n. 34, at 2-3, para. 6. DoD law enforcement organizations do not have
authority to initiate investigations to determine whether someone is heterosexual, homosexual or
bisexual. Id. at 2, para. 4. Also, an investigation into adult private consensual sexual misconduct can
usually be initiated only at the request of the service member’s commanders. Id. An exception to this
policy allows for a commander, director or principal deputy of a defense criminal investigative
organization to initiate an investigation upon a finding of “credible information” as well as a finding that
such investigation is an appropriate use of investigative resources. Id. at 2 -3, para. 6. In addition to the
DoD guidance, some services have erected additional obstacles. For instance, the Air Force requires
commanders who desire to initiate inquiries into homosexual conduct to “consult through the chain of
command with a commander possessing general court-martial convening authori ty (GCMCA) and the
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have “credible information” of homosexual conduct, not merely evidence of
homosexual orientation.102 This information must come from a “reliable
person” who directly observed a homosexual “act” or “statement” that
would lead a reasonable person to believe the member engages in, or intends
to engage in, homosexual conduct.103 The commander cannot consider
certain activities—such as presence at a gay bar or gay rights rally—as
“credible information.”104
The “Don’t Harass” aspect of the policy sought to eliminate
harassment of homosexuals by other service members. Secretary of Defense
Les Aspin issued this guidance in 1993: The Armed Forces do not tolerate
harassment or violence against any service member, for any reason.105 A
major DoD focus106 on anti-gay harassment did not occur, however, until
after the 1999 murder of Army Private First Class (PFC) Barry Winchell—a
homosexual. A fellow soldier bludgeoned PFC Winchell to death with a bat
as he slept in the barracks at Fort Campbell, Kentucky.107 Following the
murder, Secretary of Defense William Cohen ordered a DoD Inspector
General (IG) study,108 which found that during the previous year 80 percent
of the study’s respondents had heard derogatory anti-gay remarks, 37
percent had witnessed anti-gay harassment,109 and 5 percent had observed
“serious” anti-gay harassment in the form of physical assaults, vandalism, or
denial of training or career opportunities.110
As a result of this study, Secretary Cohen convened a DoD working
group to develop “better measures to address harassment based upon
perceived sexual orientation.”111 Based upon the group’s findings, Secretary
Cohen directed the four military services to implement a thirteen-point AntiHarassment Action Plan (AHAP). 112 This plan called for military-wide
harassment prevention training, comprehensive harassment reporting
servicing staff judge advocate of the initiating commander must consult with the servicing staff judge
advocate of the GCMCA.” AFI 36-3208, attch. 4.
102
See DoDD 1332.14, supra n. 34, at 69, para. E3.A4.3.1; DoDI 1332.40, supra n. 34, at 27, para. E8.3.
103
See DoDD 1332.14, supra n. 34, at 69, para. E3.A4.3.4.3; DoDI 1332.40, supra n. 34, at 27, para.
E8.4.3.
104
See DoDD 1332.14, supra n. 34, at 69, para. E3.A4.1.4.3; DoDI 1332.40, supra n. 34, at 29, para.
E8.4.3.
105
DoD Memo, supra n. 34, at attachment (“Policy Guidelines on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed
Forces”).
106
The DoD did not have an active anti-harassment policy prior to the Winchell murder. Despite a
thorough search, the authors of this Article were unable to locate evidence of any meaningful DoD antigay harassment measures, regulations, or policy guidance issued between 1993 and 1999.
107
See Off. Of the Asst. Sec. of Def. (Public Affairs). DoD News Briefing,
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2000/t07212000_t721rost.html (accessed Sept. 9, 2005); SLDN,
supra n. 12, at 20-22 (outlining facts of the murder).
108
See Off. of the Dept. of Def. Inspector Gen., Report on the Military Environment With Respect to the
Homosexual Conduct Policy, http://dont.stanford.edu/commentary/evaluation101.pdf (accessed Sept. 9,
2005) [hereinafter IG Report].
109
See IG Report, supra n. 108, at 4.
110
See IG Report, supra n. 108, at 18.
111
Linda D. Kozaryn, DoD Seeks Public Views on Homosexual Harassment,
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2000/n04202000)20004202.html (accessed Sept. 7, 2005).
112
U.S. Dept. of Def., Department of Defense Issues Anti-Harassment Guidelines,
http://www.dod.mil/releases/2000/b07212000_bt432-00.html (accessed Sept. 14, 2005) [hereinafter
Guidelines].
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mechanisms, appropriate disciplinary action against those who violate the
anti-harassment policy, and inspection programs to measure the policy’s
effectiveness.113 None of the services ever completely implemented AHAP;
instead, in 2004 the DoD, under the Bush Administration, stated that the
existing anti-harassment policies and programs were “sufficient to address
this important issue.”114
B.

“Don’t Pursue” Has Brought an End to Most “Witch Hunts”

One of the oft-repeated criticisms of “Don’t Pursue” is that it has
not been sufficiently disseminated to the lowest levels of command, leading
to numerous violations of the policy’s strict limits on investigations.115 But

113
See id. The 13-point AHAP consisted of the following principles: 1) DoD “should adopt an
overarching principle regarding harassment, including that based on sexual orientation: ‘Treatment of all
individuals with dignity and respect is essential to good order and discipline. Mistreatment, harassment,
and inappropriate comments or gestures undermine this principle and have no place in our armed forces.
Commanders and leaders must develop and maintain a climate that fosters unit cohesion, esprit de corps,
and mutual respect for all members of the command or organization;’” 2) DoD “should issue a single
Department-wide directive on harassment. It should make clear that mistreatment, harassment, and
inappropriate comments or gestures, including that based on sexual orientation, are not acceptable.
Further, the directive should make clear that commanders and leaders will be held accountable for failure
to enforce this directive;” 3) “The Services shall ensure feedback or reporting mechanisms are in place to
measure homosexual conduct policy training and anti-harassment training effectiveness in the following
three areas: knowledge, behavior, and climate;” 4) “The Services shall review all homosexual conduct
policy training and anti-harassment training programs to ensure they address the elements and intent of
the DoD overarching principle and implementing directive;” 5) “The Services shall review homosexual
conduct policy training and anti-harassment training programs annually to ensure they contain all
information required by law and policy, including the DoD overarching principle and implementing
directive, and are tailored to the grade and responsibility levels of their audiences;” 6) “The Services
shall review all avenues for reporting mistreatment, harassment, and inappropriate comments or gestures
to ensure they facilitate e ffective leadership response. Reporting at the lowest level possible within the
chain of command shall be encouraged. Personnel shall be informed of other confidential and nonconfidential avenues to report mistreatment, harassment, and inappropriate comments or gestures;” 7)
“The Services shall ensure homosexual conduct policy training and anti-harassment training programs
address all avenues to report mistreatment, harassment, and inappropriate comments or gestures and
ensure persons receiving reports of mistreatment, harassment, and inappropriate comments or gestures
know how to handle these reports;” 8) “The Services shall ensure that directives, guidance, and training
clearly explain the application of the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell,’ policy in the context of receiving and
reporting complaints of mistreatment, harassment, and inappropriate comments or gestures, including:
Complaints will be taken seriously, regardless of actual or perceived sexual orientation; those receiving
complaints must not ask about sexual orientation – questions about sexual orientation are not needed to
handle complaints; violators will be held accountable; and those reporting harassment ought not tell
about or disclose sexual orientation – information regarding sexual orientation is not needed for
complaints to be taken seriously;” 9) “The Services shall ensure that commanders and leaders take
appropriate action against anyone who engages in mistreatment, harassment, and inappropriate comments
or gestures;” 10) “The Services shall ensure that commanders and leaders take appropriate action against
anyone who condones or ignores mistreatment, harassment, and inappropriate comments or gestures;”
11) “The Services shall examine homosexual conduct policy training and anti-harassment training
programs t o ensure they provide tailored training on enforcement mechanisms;” 12) “The Services shall
ensure inspection programs assess adherence to the DoD overarching principle and implementing
directive through measurement of knowledge, behavior, and climate;” and 13) “The Services shall
determine the extent to which homosexual conduct policy training and anti-harassment training
programs, and the implementation of this action plan, are effective in addressing mistreatment,
harassment, and inappropriate comments or gestures.” U.S. Dep. of Def., DoD Anti-Harassment Action
Plan, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2000/plan20000721.htm (accessed Sept. 14, 2005)
[hereinafter AHAP].
114
Letter from David S. C. Chu, Under Sec. of Def. (Personnel and Readiness), to the Honorable James
Langevin [hereinafter Chu’s Letter] (June 24, 2004).
115
SLDN, supra n. 12, at 19.
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if one defines a “witch hunt” as an intense effort to investigate or expose a
service member’s suspected orientation without evidence of the member’s
homosexual conduct, then “Don’t Pursue” has made important strides. The
non-partisan Congressional Research Service has concluded that “the data
would not appear to support the general existence of such [witch-hunt]
tactics.” 116 As a Pentagon spokesman noted, “It is only when [homosexuals]
declare themselves or openly practice their sexual preference that we [the
DoD] have no alternative but to begin the investigative process . . . .”117
Despite the improvement in avoiding improper investigative tactics,
critics of “Don’t Pursue” have documented individual cases where
commanders and other military officials failed to follow the policy.118 But
as one commentator argues, “[T]his list of evils does not say anything more
about the [‘Don’t Pursue’] policy than the investigative abuses of all sorts of
laws say about their substantive value . . . . Whenever laws are enforced,
there is a risk of abusive and outrageous conduct on the part of the
enforcer.”119 On the whole, “Don’t Pursue” has made progress despite
individual failures. It has discouraged improper investigations and required
concrete and reliable evidence prior to the commencement of investigations.
Even critics of the policy have acknowledged that it has decreased “witch
hunts” and criminal investigations of homosexuals.120
In short, “Don’t Pursue” in its current form is meeting its goals.
C.

“Don’t Harass” Has Not Yet Addressed Anti-Gay Harassment
Sufficiently

“Don’t Harass” remains the one area of the policy still in need of
significant improvement. Critics charge that the DoD has failed to

116

Burrelli & Dale, supra n. 26, at 9.
Id. (citing Patty Reinert, Is the Military Out o f Step?, Houston Chron. Feb. 6, 2 005).
See Samuel A. Marcosson, A Price Too High: Enforcing the Ban on Gays and Lesbians in the
Military and the Inevitability of Intrusiveness, 64 UMKC L. Rev. 59 (1995) (cataloguing a parade of
horribles in enforcement of various bans on homosexual conduct in the military). As one example of
“Don’t Pursue’s” failure, critics cite to a Navy memorandum from 1996 that instructs psychologists to
report service members who seek counseling for homosexual issues. See SLDN, supra n. 12, at 16
(citing Dept. of Navy, NAVMED P-5134, General Medical Officer (GMO) Manual (May 1996)). Critics
also reference an Air Force memorandum from Richard A. Peterson that indicates that after a member
makes an open statement of homosexuality, investigators should question such people as the member’s
parents, siblings, school counselors, and close friends. See SLDN, supra n. 12, at 1 (citing Richard A.
Peterson, Commander Inquiries on Members Stating They are Homosexual (Nov. 3, 1994)). While the
Navy’s memorandum may violate the spirit of President Clinton’s policy, the criticism of the Peterson
memo misses its mark. The memo only allows questioning of friends and family after a service member
has initiated the discharge process by voluntarily making a prohibited statement. Once this statement is
made, military commanders must have the flexibility to investigate. To do otherwise would be to allow
any individual to end his service early with an honorable discharge simply by making an unsubstantiated
statement. As seen with the Lackland experiment, it is possible that these statements are falsely made to
avoid military service. See supra n. 82-83, and accompanying text. The most reasonable way to verify
such statements is to ask those who know the individual best.
119
Young, supra n. 25, at 103 (defending the policy).
120
SLDN, supra n. 12, at 19. In fact, the SLDN admits that the new rules over time began to be
“generally observed,” citing security clearance procedures and requirements that investigations receive
approval by higher headquarters before initiation. Id.
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implement the AHAP, as Secretary Cohen ordered in 1999.121 The DoD,
under the Bush Administration, has responded that sufficient measures are
already in place to guard against anti-gay harassment.122 In reality, each of
the military services has implemented some degree of anti-harassment
training. 123 But this training is much smaller in scope and detail than that
contemplated by the AHAP. 124 Critics see this as a retreat from the DoD’s
commitment to the goal of eradicating anti-gay harassment in the military; 125
however, there is no solid data on whether the current level of training is
adequate. Therefore, more research needs to be done in this area.
Although the AHAP does not mandate confidential reporting of
anti-gay harassment, it does anticipate that confidential reporting will
sometimes be available. 126 Not surprisingly, members may hesitate to report
harassment if they believe they will be investigated and discharged. This is
an area that requires further action. While victims of other types of
harassment—such as that based on race and gender—are free to report
harassment without fear of adverse consequences,127 victims of anti-gay
harassment have no such protections. For instance, victims of anti-gay
harassment may not file complaints with military equal employment
opportunity offices.128 And although they may file complaints with their

121

See SLDN, supra n. 12, at 6-7.
See Chu’s Letter, supra n. 114.
123
See id. Even critics of “Don’t Harass” recognize that the military services have made some progress
in implementing AHAP. The SLDN recently reviewed the recent anti-harassment measures and training
implemented by the individual services and noted various implementations. See generally SLDN, supra
n. 12, at 25-43. Some of the mentioned measures included: 1) improved training for senior
noncommissioned officers in the Army (see id. at 26); 2) improved training materials for
noncommissioned officers Army-wide (see id. at 27); 3) Air Force implementation of homosexual
conduct policy training tailored to certain audiences (specifically, general audiences, commanders, judge
advocates, and law enforceme nt personnel) which contains anti-harassment guidance (see id. at 32); 4)
the Navy’s inclusion of anti-harassment training in its general military training for equal opportunity,
sexual harassment prevention, and grievance procedures (see id. at 35) ; and 5) an effort by the Marine
Corps to review and revise its homosexual conduct policy training guidance (see id. at 41).
124
For example, the AHAP directed that such training be tailored to the grade and responsibility levels of
their audiences. Guidelines, supra n. 112.
125
While discrimination against individuals on the basis of race, color, religion, age, physical or mental
disability, sex or national origin is explicitly prohibited by DoD regulation, discrimination or harassment
against homosexuals does not receive the same level of protection. See Department of Defense Military
Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, DoDD 1350.2, para. 4.2 (Dept. of Def., Aug. 18, 1995). For the
previously-mentioned protected categories, commanders are required to ensure that MEO programs are
understood and executed on all levels, the organizational equal opportunity climate is routinely assessed
for effectiveness, MEO programs are continuously reviewed and updated to eliminate unlawful
discrimination, and such policies are posted and enfo rced. See id. at para. 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3, and 6.2.4.
Homosexual harassment prevention does not receive this level of attention.
126
See AHAP, supra n. 113, Item # 6.
127
See Military Whistleblower Protection, DoDD 7050.6, para. 4.2–4.4 (June 23, 2000) (providing
protections to those who make complaints based on race or gender).
128
See Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program, A.F. Instr . 36-2706, para. 6.1.2 (Dept. of the A.F.,
July 29, 2004) (providing Air Force guidance that “[t]he MEO office must immediately refer all
allegations of homosexual conduct or perceived or alleged harassment based on sexual orientation to the
alleged offender’s military commander for action.”); Navy Equal Opportunity (EO) Policy, OPNAVI
5354.1E, para. 6(a) (Dept. of the Navy, Jan. 22, 2001) (addressing in the Navy only unlawful
discrimination and sexual harassment against “persons or groups based on race, ethnicity, national origin,
sex, or religion,” not victims of homosexual harassment); Equal Employment Opportunity and
Affirmative Action, AR 690-12, para. 1-6(a) (Dept. of the Army, Mar. 4, 1 988) (offering Army protection
122
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service’s inspector general (IG), the IG cannot assure them
confidentiality.129 The only truly confidential military avenues for victims
of anti-gay harassment are to seek help from a military chaplain or defense
attorney, neither of whom are trained, directed, or empowered to handle
such complaints.130
Further compounding this problem, commanders who are faced with
“credible information” of homosexual conduct have limited options. A
commander cannot use a report of anti-gay harassment as a basis to
discharge the victim.
But that commander must initiate discharge
proceedings against the victim if an investigation into the harassment turns
up credible information of the victim’s homosexual conduct.131 This
problem defies an easy solution, with few real options outside of granting
amnesty or immunity to those who report harassment132 or creating an
entirely separate harassment-investigation office cloaked with
confidentiality. Yet, without a more confidential reporting mechanism,
“Don’t Harass” may never truly succeed.
The DoD should explore new options for confidential reporting that
break the paradigms associated with other types of harassment. Improving
confidential reporting would significantly enhance “Don’t Harass.” At the
same time, it would help resolve the problems with “Don’t Tell”—

from unlawful discrimination to only those who suffer discrimination based on “race, color, religion, sex,
age, national origin, or handicap,” not to victims of homosexual harassment).
129
See Inspector General Complaints Resolution, AFI 90-301, para. 2.3 (quoting “[T]he IG has the
responsibility to safeguard the personal identity and complaints of individuals seeking assistance . . . .
[T]his does not mean that communications made to an IG are privileged or confidential . . . .”) and para.
2.39.10 (quoting “[The IG] [h]as no authority to grant express promises of confidentiality to subjects,
suspects, complainants or witnesses.”) (Dept. of the A.F., Feb. 8, 2005).
130
As with the other services, this is also the case in the Air Force. See Air Force Military Defense
Counsel Charter, Part B – MDC Services, AFLSA/JAJD OI 1, para. 2 (Dept of A.F., July 1, 1998)
(indicating that, while client communications made to Air Force defense counsel are privileged, the
processing or pursuit of anti-homosexual harassment complaints are not among the duties allotted to such
attorneys). See also Chaplain – Planning and Organizing, AFI 52 -101, para. 4.1 and 2.1 (Dept. of A.F.
May 10, 2005) (providing that communications to Air Force chaplains are privileged, but noting that
chaplains serve to “provide spiritual care and ethical leadership,” and “do not perform duties
incompatible with their faith group tenets, professional role, or noncombatant status”); see also Moskos
& Benecke, supra n. 7 (quoting “The Department of Defense must order inspectors general, law
enforcement officials, psychologists and doctors not to out gay service members who seek their help. It
should forbid military judges and members of discharge boards from considering statements from these
officials as evidence of homosexuality.”).
131
See DoDD 1332.14, supra n. 34, at 27, para. E3.A1.1.8.1.2 (“A member shall be separated under this
section if one or more of the following approved findings is made . . . [listing homosexual conduct]”); see
also DoDI 1332.40, supra n. 34, at para. E2.3.1 (“A commissioned officer shall be separated under this
section if one or more of the following approved findings is made . . . . [listing homosexual conduct]”).
132
See Off. of the Dept. of Def. Inspector Gen., Evaluation of Sexual Assault, Reprisal, and Related
Leadership Challenges at the United States Air Force Academy, (Dec. 3, 2004) (available at
http://www.dodig.osd.mil/fo/foia/ERR/IPO2004C003-report.pdf) (discussing how the Air Force
Academy began a program of amnesty for victims of sexual assault and why that policy was ended). See
also DoDD 6495.01, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program, para. E3.1.4 (Oct. 6,
2005) (recognizing the “need to provide an option for confidential restricted reporting” in sexual assault
cases); Memo. from David S. C. Chu, Under Sec. of Def., to the Sec. of the Military Departments, Sexual
Assault Evidence Collection and Preservation Under Restricted Reporting (JTF-SAPR-014) (June 30,
2005) (holding that “[r]estricted reporting allows sexual assault victims to confidentially disclose the
details of their assault to specifically identified individuals … without triggering the official investigative
process…”).
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specifically, the high number of “statement” discharges.133 Critics assert
that—since victims cannot report harassment without fear of reprisal—they
make homosexual statements to avoid the harassment through discharge.134
If this is true, confidential reporting could dramatically reduce the number
of homosexual conduct discharges.
In sum, the military has yet to find an effective way to deal with the
quagmire of confidential reporting in order to encourage victims to come
forward. “Don’t Harass” has thus been the least successful in fulfilling the
original purpose and vision of the policy: to allow members the ability to
serve without fear of harassment due to their sexual orientation.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF “DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL ”

Whatever one thinks of “Don’t’ Ask, Don’t Tell,” the policy is
federal law. Neither Congress nor the Executive Branch is politically likely
to push for change in the near future.135 But the threat of judicial
repudiation of the military’s homosexuality policy has always been
present.136 And though the policy has survived various legal challenges to
its constitutionality, 137 the policy has also suffered judicial setbacks,

133

See review supra n. 70-84, and accompanying text.
See SLDN, supra n. 12.
135
With a newly elected, more conservative Congress, it is unlikely that any change to the policy will be
initiated from the Legislative Branch, although some Democratic members are proposing changes.
Congressman Marty Meehan (D-Ma), is currently working on l egislation to repeal 10 U.S.C. § 654 and
ban military discrimination based on sexual orientation. See Liz Sidoti, Military Gay Policy Costs
Talent,
Associated
Press
(Feb.
25,
2005)
(available
at
http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/PressClips/05_0224_AP.htm). If this legislation were successful, it
would also forbid the military from re-instituting a “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy ever again. See id.;
see also Deborah Funk, Lawmaker Pitches Bill to Let Gays Openly Serve, A.F. Times 26 (Mar. 21, 2005)
(discussing the proposed legislation and quoting Rep. Meehan as calling “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” “a
failed policy whose time has passed”). Moreover, President George W. Bush’s administration has
supported the policy. See Arnold Abrams, Taking on ‘Don’t Ask’; More and More, In and Out of
Service, Speak Out Against Policy, Newsday A08 (Feb. 17, 2004) (citing President Bush’s support of the
policy); see also CNN, America Votes 2004: The Issues/George Bush, http://www.cnn.com/
ELECTION/ 2004/special/president/issues/index.bush.new.html (accessed Sept. 9, 2005). For that
reason, there is little chance that in the next four years any push from the DoD will result in major
changes to the policy.
136
See benShalom v. Alexander, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (finding a substantive due process
violation in the Army’s discharge of a lesbian and ordering reinstatement of the soldier in the Army
reserves); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (striking down Army enlistment
regulation 140-111 as violating the First and Fifth Amendments), rev’d, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989)
(finding the regulation permissible and allowing the Army to refuse re-enlistment to Ben-Shalom); see
also Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding pre-policy naval rules on
homosexual discharge); Watkins v. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (estopping the Army from failing
to re-enlist gay soldier, where the Army had ignored its own regulations in the past by re-enlisting the
same soldier despite knowing of his homosexuality).
137
See Holmes v. Cal. Army Natl. Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell”); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding policy in face of due process
and First Amendment challenges); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding policy
where member had engaged in homosexual acts and intended to continue homosexual conduct);
Thomasson, 80 F.3d 915 (upholding a statements case discharge because speech declaring homosexuality
is the equivalent of a homosexual act or the propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts); Steffan,
41 F.3d 677 (upholding Navy homosexual discharge policy based on statements of homosexuality
because this put Steffan in sufficiently close class to those who engaged in or intended to engage in
homosexual conduct); Hoffman v. U.S., 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P44,621 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (granting
the United States summary judgment in challenge to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” based on First Amendment
134
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including some lower courts striking the policy down as unconstitutional.138
And the legal landscape continues to change, both within the military
services’ own courts and at the highest federal levels.
In 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas,139 the Supreme Court struck down a
Texas homosexual sodomy statute and recognized for the first time that
homosexuals possess a constitutional liberty interest to enter into private
sexual relationships and form “enduring” personal bonds—all part of “their
dignity as free persons” and their right to live without oppression.140
Following Lawrence, critics questioned whether “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is
still constitutional.141 Some predict that Lawrence will have an especially
far-reaching impact on a multitude of laws.142
After Lawrence, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(CAAF) considered whether Article 125, UCMJ—which regulates both
heterosexual and homosexual sodomy within the military—survives
Lawrence. In United States v. Marcum,143 the CAAF chose not to rule on a
facial challenge to Article 125, but to evaluate each sodomy case
individually to see whether its facts implicated Lawrence’s liberty
interest.144 Assessing the facts in Marcum—homosexual sodomy within the
grounds); see also Burrelli & Dale, supra n. 26, at 12-21 (discussing in depth the various legal
challenges to the policy); but see Kelly E. Henriksen, Student Author, Note & Comment: Gays, the
Military, and Judicial Deference: When the Courts Must Reclaim Equal Protection as their Area of
Expertise, 9 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 1273 (1996) (criticizing the courts’ use of rational basis review when
evaluating “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” under the equal protection clause).
138
See Able v. U.S., 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (striking down 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1) as
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause), rev’d, 155 F.3d 628 (2nd Cir. 1997); Hensala v.
A..F., 343 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment against Hensala for recoupment based
on homo sexual discharge on Equal Protection and First Amendment claims); Meinhold v. U.S. Dept. of
Def., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 35603 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Navy acted in bad faith by
discharging member who did not express a genuine homosexual statement); McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F.
Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding that the Navy violated its own regulations when investigating alleged
homosexual statements and reinstating discharged seaman). See also Note, Student Author,
Constitutional Law – First Amendment and Equal Protection – Ninth Circuit Upholds “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” Policy for Gays and Lesbians in the Military – Holmes v. California Army National Guard, 124
F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997), 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1371 (1998) (arguing that the statement prong of the policy
should fail both a strict scrutiny analysis and a more deferential analysis).
139
539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
140
Id. Lawrence unequivocally overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which had been
used to deny the existence of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in homosexual relationships.
See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 95-112 (analyzing the Lawrence decision).
141
In December 2004, a dozen former military officers raised a challenge to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in a
Boston federal court. See “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Faces Court Test, Associated Press (Dec. 6, 2004)
(available at http:// www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041206-120819-7634r)
(discussing the challenge). That decision has not yet been released. See also Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2005) (refusing to find the policy unconstitutional after Lawrence during a
challenge to the Solomon Amendment).
142
See Susan A. Blazie r, Note: The Irrational Use of Rational Basis Review in Lawrence v. Texas:
Implications for our Society, 26 Campbell L. Rev. 21 (2004) (arguing that the Court’s controversial
reasoning in Lawrence can be used to strike down many types of laws based on morality, including
prostitution laws and those forbidding suicide).
143
See 60 M.J. 198 (App. Armed Forces 2004). In Marcum, an Air Force Technical Sergeant was
convicted of consensual sodomy with a lower-ranking airman who he supervised within the chain of
command. The sodomy occurred in the appellant’s off-base apartment during off-duty hours with no one
else present. See id. at 207.
144
The Marcum court erected a three-part analysis to determine whether a particular case is o utside the
scope of the liberty interest articulated in Lawrence:
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chain of command—the court found such intimate contact was not covered
under Lawrence’s liberty interest. 145 The court expressly refused to decide
what impact, if any, Congress’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” findings might
have on Article 125’s constitutionality.146
Marcum emphasized two rationales that may save “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” from Lawrence.147 First, Lawrence’s liberty interest may give
way to the military status of the involved homosexuals. In Marcum, the
court cited exceptions to the Lawrence liberty interest, such as sodomy with
minors or those “who are situated in relationships where consent might not
easily be refused.”148 Seeing the rank structure as an area where consent
may not be freely given, the court found that homosexual conduct within the
chain of command fell outside Lawrence’s protected liberty interest. 149
Second, courts must consider the “military culture” when assessing the
“liberty interest” of homosexuals in the armed forces. The CAAF noted that
in the military—a “specialized society”—“constitutional rights may apply
differently . . . .”150 The court pointed out that “military culture and
mission” and “the nuance of military life” must be considered when
First, was the conduct that the accused was found guilty of committing of a nature to
bring it within the liberty interest identified by the Supreme Court? Second, did the
conduct encompass any behavior or factors identified by the Supreme Court as
outside the analysis in Lawrence? Third, are there additional factors relevant solely
in the military environment that affect the nature and reach of the Lawrence liberty
interest?
Id. at 2 06-207. Thus far, the CAAF and lower military courts have been willing to apply this three-part
framework to uphold sodomy convictions. See U.S. v. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. 297 (App. Armed Forces 2004)
(upholding sodomy conviction between enlisted and officer member on 42-person naval vessel due to
special military concerns that took the case out of the ambit of the Lawrence decision); U.S. v. Myers,
2005 CCA LEXIS 44 (U.S. Navy-Marine Corps. Ct. of Crim. App. 2005) (using the three-part test to
distinguish Lawrence and uphold conviction for sodomy).
145
Marcum, 60 M.J. at 208.
146
Id.
147
See Arthur S. Leonard, Lawrence v. Texas and the New Law of Gay Rights, 30 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 189,
207 (2004) (analyzing Lawrence and suggesting that “judicial deference to military expertise” may allow
Article 125 and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” to survive judicial scrutiny); see also Diane H. Mazur, ReFraming the Debate: Symposium Article: Is “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Unconstitutional After Lawrence?
What It Will Take to Overturn the Policy, 15 Fla. J.L. & Pub. Policy 423 (2004) (highly criticizing postLawrence government efforts to defend Article 125, UCMJ, and “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” and arguing
that the policy is unconstitutional after Lawrence).
148
Marcum, 60 M.J. at 203-04. When discussing Lawrence, the court commented:
While finding the Texas statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Court stated that
“the present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might
be injured or coerced or who are situated in rel ationships where consent might not
easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution.” Id. The
Supreme Court did not expressly state whether or not this text represented an
exhaustive or illustrative list of exceptions to the liberty interest identified,
whether this text was intended to suggest areas where legislators might
affirmatively legislate, or whether this text was intended to do no more than
identify areas not addressed by the Court. Nor did the Supreme Court squarely
place its analysis within a traditional framework for constitutional review.
Id.; see also id. at 203 (noting that the Supreme Court left the door open for the lower courts to explore the
scope, nature, and limits of this liberty right).
149
Id. at 208.
150
Id. at 205 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
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evaluating Lawrence’s liberty interest. 151 But do consensual homosexual
acts that occur outside the military rank structure also fall outside of
Lawrence’s liberty interest? That question remains to be decided.152
V.

CONCLUSION

When evaluating “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” by the measuring stick of
its originally stated purposes, the policy is a qualified success. It has
allowed homosexuals to enter military service with no “sexual orientation”
barriers—“Don’t Ask.” When homosexual members can abstain from
prohibited conduct, the policy has permitted them to serve honorably despite
their sexual orientation. While keeping one’s sexual orientation secret may
be too difficult for some members, those who refrain from self-reporting can
achieve a successful military career—“Don’t Tell.” Despite isolated
incidents of improper investigating, homosexuals generally can live their
military lives without fear of “witch hunts” to uncover their sexual
orientation—“Don’t Pursue.” Unfortunately, if those members suffer antigay harassment within the ranks, they still face a risk in reporting such
harassment—especially where they have violated the prohibitions on
homosexual conduct or statements. For that reason, “Don’t Harass” remains
the area most in need of improvement.

151

Id. at 20 6-07.
The Army Court of Criminal Appeals has decided two unpublished cases in the past year where the
court used the Lawrence and Marcum cases to find that Article 125, UCMJ, had been applied
unconstitutionally against service members. See United States v. Bullock, Docket # 20030534 (Army Ct.
Crim. App. 2004) (unpub. op.) and United States v. Barber, Docket # 20000413 (Army Ct. Crim. App.
2004) (unpub op.). Both cases, however, dealt with consensual heterosexual sodomy between two adults,
without any additional factors that might remove the conduct from the protected Lawrence liberty
interest.
152
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